“Who controls the food supply controls the people.” – Henry Kissinger

Key points                                                                              

  • After decades of abundant food supply, abrupt changes in the agricultural commodity equilibrium may have long-lasting effects for consumers.       
  • Rising energy prices and geopolitical posturing appear likely to strain food delivery networks across the globe.
  • Supply/demand dynamics in the agricultural sector provide opportunities for nimble investors to capitalise on the increasing dislocations in the supply chain.

The global agriculture and food network is an intricate, interconnected system. Any disruption to one part can have ripple effects throughout the entire network, often with unintended consequences. We believe that there is complacency about the supply of commodities in general, and agriculture in particular. Much of the world is accustomed to having a food supply that is readily available and cheap. However, there are numerous examples where food has the potential to spark economic and humanitarian crises. We see agriculture increasingly as both a driver and victim of geopolitical volatility.

The haves and have nots

When investing in commodities, we refer to the concept of the ‘haves’ versus the ‘have nots’. Consider the fact that approximately four-fifths of the world’s population lives in countries that are net importers of food. Using wheat as an example: in 2021, Russia and Ukraine were the world’s largest and fifth-largest exporters of wheat, respectively. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, nearly 50 countries depend on Russia and Ukraine for more than 30% of their wheat imports (26 countries are over 50% reliant on the Black Sea region). Including all other agricultural products, Russia and Ukraine provide almost an eighth of the global calories traded. Approximately 86% of all global wheat exports come from only seven countries, with three countries holding nearly 68% of the total world’s wheat reserve.[1] To put these figures into context, one of the biggest commodity cartels, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), controls only one-third of global crude oil supply. Disruption in one region of ‘haves’, in this case Russia and Ukraine, could have massive ramifications for the global community that relies on stable trade flows.

Interconnection with traditional energy

Investors have become accustomed to seeing daily headlines about energy prices. The downstream effects of energy geopolitics on agricultural production, however, do not make the news. The link between food/agriculture and hydrocarbon has been one of the most underappreciated and dynamic relationships of the last several decades. One of the key reasons that food has never been more plentiful and secure is abundant hydrocarbons, which have allowed for synthetic fertilisers and cheaper horsepower to drive massive productivity increases. Over the last two centuries, for example, the amount of human labour required to produce a kilogram of wheat in the US fell from ten minutes to less than two seconds.

The largest portion of an average corn farm’s non-land cost is fertilisers, which account for approximately 25%. Nitrogen fertiliser, which has to be applied every year and is crucial to crop yield/health, is made from either natural gas or coal. Other crop chemicals (pesticides, herbicide, fungicide) account for approximately 13% of non-land costs and are mainly derived from petroleum. Finally, direct fuel and utilities account for another 6-8%.[2] In the current context, the global nitrogen industry has seen widespread curtailments as natural gas prices have spiked and supplies tightened following Russia’s weaponisation of its natural gas supply. This will eventually affect applications and yields, and ultimately put upward pressure on grain prices. Should the global energy landscape become more geopolitically unstable, agriculture will unfortunately be one of the most affected areas.

Food wars: weaponisation and nationalisation of agriculture

Supply chains can be re-shored — with enough time and capital, a Taiwanese semiconductor lab can be replicated almost anywhere in the world. On the other hand, a farm cannot, as centuries of food production have demonstrated. What happens to global supply/demand balances if the ‘haves’ decide to use their agriculture leverage to advance national agendas? Prior to the Russian invasion, Ukraine exported 98% of its grain production through its ports in the Black Sea. Since the ports have been shut, grain export volume has struggled to find passage via rail and barge. The grains that have managed to make it out have faced massive delays and significantly increased cost. What if Odessa (main Ukraine Black Sea port) is the next Nord Stream (natural gas pipeline supplying Russian gas to Germany)? Furthermore, numerous governments have already acknowledged the scarcity of land and the importance of food security. For decades, Chinese state-owned and private companies have been on a global buying spree, snapping up land, grain elevators, and processing plants throughout the world. This is important to note — commodities are real assets; millions of acres of arable land with appropriate growing conditions cannot be recreated.

Investment opportunities and pitfalls

In the coming decades food demand and cost are likely to rise, and potential global shortages could drive instability in the world order. The investment implications fall into two main perspectives: 1) there is a genuine scarcity value in agricultural assets that is very difficult to replicate or substitute; when a mispriced asset class collides with inelastic, structural demand, the result will be a secular reset of prices (higher); and 2) food scarcity, volatility and insecurity will create massive dispersion between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’, which we believe should generate investment opportunities.

[1] Source: Ingini, Martina. “How Wheat Shortage Is Sparking a Global Food Crisis,” 30 May 2022. (https://earth.org/wheat-shortage).

[2] Source: Schnitkey, G., C. Zulauf, K. Swanson and N. Paulson. “2022 Updated Crop Budgets.” farmdoc daily (11):162, Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 7 December 2021.

This is a financial promotion. These opinions should not be construed as investment or other advice and are subject to change. This material is for information purposes only. This material is for professional investors only. Any reference to a specific security, country or sector should not be construed as a recommendation to buy or sell investments in those securities, countries or sectors. Please note that holdings and positioning are subject to change without notice. This article was written by members of the NIMNA investment team. ‘Newton’ and/or ‘Newton Investment Management’ is a corporate brand which refers to the following group of affiliated companies: Newton Investment Management Limited (NIM) and Newton Investment Management North America LLC (NIMNA). NIMNA was established in 2021 and is comprised of the equity and multi-asset teams from an affiliate, Mellon Investments Corporation.

Important information

This material is for Australian wholesale clients only and is not intended for distribution to, nor should it be relied upon by, retail clients. This information has not been prepared to take into account the investment objectives, financial objectives or particular needs of any particular person. Before making an investment decision you should carefully consider, with or without the assistance of a financial adviser, whether such an investment strategy is appropriate in light of your particular investment needs, objectives and financial circumstances.

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Newton Investment Management Limited (Newton) is authorised and regulated in the UK by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 12 Endeavour Square, London, E20 1JN. Newton is providing financial services to wholesale clients in Australia in reliance on ASIC Corporations (Repeal and Transitional) Instrument 2016/396, a copy of which is on the website of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, www.asic.gov.au. The instrument exempts entities that are authorised and regulated in the UK by the FCA, such as Newton, from the need to hold an Australian financial services license under the Corporations Act 2001 for certain financial services provided to Australian wholesale clients on certain conditions. Financial services provided by Newton are regulated by the FCA under the laws and regulatory requirements of the United Kingdom, which are different to the laws applying in Australia.

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